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 “Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool employed by individuals in the 
conduct of private business have become an institution—an institution which has brought such 
concentration of economic power that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to 
dominate the state. The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a small 
group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in size by their personal wealth, is 
being supplanted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of 
employees and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are subjected, 
through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few men. Ownership has been separated 
from control; and this separation has removed many of the checks which formerly operated to 
curb the misuse of wealth and power. And, as ownership of the shares is becoming continually 
more dispersed, the power which formerly accompanied ownership is becoming increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a few. The changes thereby wrought in the lives of the workers, 
of the owners and of the general public, are so fundamental and far-reaching as to lead these 
scholars to compare the evolving ‘corporate system’ with the feudal system; and to lead other 
men of insight and experience to assert that this ‘master institution of civilised life’ is 
committing it to the rule of a plutocracy”. Justice Brandeis (dissenting in part) in Liggett Co. 
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (footnote omitted). 
 
“If Wal-Mart were a country, its revenues would make it on par with the GDP of the 25th 
largest economy in the world, surpassing 157 smaller countries.”  Vincent Trivett, 25 US 
Mega Corporations: Where They Rank if They Were Countries.1  
 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School.  The author would 
like to express her thanks to Warren Rees, research librarian at the Kresge Law Library, 
University of Notre Dame Law School, for his invaluable help in cheerfully finding obscure, 
and not-so-obscure, source materials for this article. 
 1  Vincent Trivett, 25 US Mega Corporations: Where They Rank if They Were Countries, 
BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2011), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/25-
corporations-bigger-tan-countries-2011-6?op=1. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The activities of multi-national corporations (hereinafter MNCs) impact on the 
communities in which they operate in many ways. Recent examples include the 
environmental impact of British Petroleum’s operation of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
rig which spilled millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico;
2
 the human rights 
impact of the alleged use of the military by Royal Dutch Shell to protect its oil 
facilities in Nigeria resulting in violence against the Ogoni people;
3
 or the corrupting 
influence on governmental programs and officials caused by bribery payments 
allegedly made by Siemens to officials in, inter alia, Bangladesh, Argentina, and 
China.
4
 
Internal corporate codes of conduct have been in existence for quite some time.  
These codes mainly address internal rules for the company’s own employees to 
follow, such as maintaining confidential information, avoiding conflicts of interest 
and prohibiting bribery.  A second type of corporate code emerged in the 1990s 
addressing external corporate relationships, such as those with suppliers and the 
communities affected by corporate conduct.  These types of codes are generally 
concerned with issues of corporate social responsibility.  It is these latter types of 
codes which are the focus of this article. 
Specifically, this article addresses the concept of corporate social responsibility 
(hereinafter CSR) as it relates to labor rights.  It considers the following issues: is the 
CSR model, as evidenced by the adoption of corporate codes of conduct (hereinafter 
CoC), effective in protecting labor rights; and is this model the best way to protect 
labor rights?  These issues are examined from two perspectives: practical and 
philosophical.  Lastly, some alternative enforcement mechanisms are considered and 
their respective advantages and disadvantages for purposes of ensuring labor rights 
are discussed. 
II.  CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT 
Activists and NGOs responded to news exposés of sweatshop conditions at 
overseas factories manufacturing consumer goods for MNCs by demanding 
accountability for worker rights violations.  The public outcry over worker 
exploitation by Levi Strauss’ contractors in Saipan5 and in Nike factories in 
Indonesia
6
 eventually led those corporations to establish supply chain codes of 
conduct meant to ensure labor rights. Levi Strauss adopted one of the first corporate 
                                                          
  2  See BP Oil Spill, THE GUARDIAN, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/bp-oil-spill (last visited August 11, 2014). 
  3  See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
  4 Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery was Just a Line Item, N. Y. 
TIMES (December 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=1&. 
  5 Frank Swoboda, Levi Strauss to Drop Suppliers Violating its Worker Rights Rules, 
THE WASH. POST, March 13, 1992, at D1. 
  6 Jeff Balinger, Nike Chronology, CENTER FOR COMM. AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, 
http://depts.washington.edu/ccce/polcommcampaigns/NikeChronology.htm (last visited May 
28.2014). 
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codes of conduct to address supply-chain/business partner labor issues in 1992,
7
 
closely followed by Nike that same year.  Ten years later over 1,000 companies had 
some type of CSR code,
8
 and the numbers continue to rise. 
Of course not all of these CoCs address labor rights issues. Those which do 
generally focus on issues related to compliance with domestic wage and hour laws, 
and the prohibition on child labor, forced labor and discrimination.  What is 
conspicuously absent in many of these codes is protection for freedom of association 
(FOA) and the right to collectively bargain (CB). A 1998 International Labor 
Organization (ILO) study of 215 CoCs found that only 15% referenced to FOA and 
CB.
9
  A similar study of 246 codes published by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2001 found that only 148 included any 
labor standards and of those only 29.7% mentioned FOA.
10
  A 2012 study of 600 
publicly- traded companies indicated that 43% had supplier CoCs.
11
  The latter study 
looked specifically at the footware/apparel/food and beverage/retail/technology 
hardware sectors and found only 38% of companies in these sectors had CoCs which 
referred to the ILO’s core labor standards including, inter alia, FOA and CB.12 
Why is the omission of FOA and CB problematic?  One is reminded of the 
proverb: “Give a man a fish and he eats for a day; teach a man to fish and he eats for 
a lifetime.” CoCs which fail to protect FOA and CB supposedly give the workers 
certain employment-related benefits without ensuring that workers have the means 
either to enforce compliance with those benefits or to respond to new employment 
issues that may arise. As noted by Auret van Heerden, President and CEO of the Fair 
Labor Association (a third party CoC monitoring group): “You can never visit 
facilities often enough to make sure they stay compliant – you’ll ever have enough 
inspectors to do that.  What really keeps factories compliant is when workers have a 
                                                          
  7 Mark Anner, Corporate Social Responsibility and Freedom of Association Rights: The 
Precarious Quest for Legitimacy and Control in Global Supply Chains, 40 POL. & SOC’Y 
609, 613 (2012). 
  8  JAN MARTIN WITTE, REALIZING CORE LABOR STANDARDS: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS 
OF VOLUNTARY CODES AND SOCIAL CLAUSES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 53 (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH 2008), available at 
http://old.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Studie-CLS-endfassung.pdf. 
  9  INT’L LABOUR ORG., OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OFFICE ACTIVITIES 
CONCERNING CODES OF CONDUCT, SOCIAL LABELING AND OTHER PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES 
ADDRESSING LABOUR ISSUES ¶47 and ¶56 (1998), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/sdl-1.htm. 
  10  Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded 
Review of their Contents 8, 10 (Directorate for Fin., Fiscal and Enter. Affairs Working Papers 
on Int’l Inv. No. 2001/6, 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/WP-2001_6.pdf. 
  11  CERES & SUSTAINALYTICS, THE ROAD TO 2020: CORPORATE PROGRESS ON THE CERES 
ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY 36 (2012), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/the-road-to-
2020-corporate-progress-on-the-ceres-roadmap-for-sustainability/view. 
  12  Id.  In 1998 the ILO adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work highlighting four core labor rights: freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
abolition of child labor and forced labor, and the elimination of discrimination in employment 
and occupation.  These four principles are often referred to as “core labor standards.” 
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voice and they can speak out when something isn’t right.”13  Under the CoC regime, 
workers may be protected from unsafe conditions for a day, but are left vulnerable to 
workplace injury or death for a lifetime. 
Another philosophical problem with MNC CoCs is that a private actor is picking 
and choosing the standards for which it will be held “accountable.”  The entity being 
governed by the standards is deciding what those standards are.  Given general 
corporate dislike of trade union “interference”, it should come as no surprise that 
many corporations would choose not to be held accountable for protecting FOA or 
CB.  Moreover, the private actor who is doing the choosing is the employer; the 
entity which controls the workers is telling the workers which workplace problems 
they should be concerned about, thereby reinforcing the inequality present in the 
workplace hierarchy and undermining the inherent dignity of the individual worker. 
III.  MONITORING CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT 
Even assuming these CoCs explicitly require protection for the core labor 
standards as defined by the ILO, the question arises as to the effectiveness of the 
mechanism for ensuring the code is followed.   First, the sheer number of suppliers 
within any MNC supply chain makes monitoring problematic.  For example, 
Walmart has over 100,000 suppliers worldwide.
14
  In two regions (one in Pakistan 
and one in India) there are 500 businesses active in the football stitching industry 
and 3400 subcontractors.
15
  In 2012 there were over 5000 garment factories in 
Bangladesh alone.
16
  It would be a gargantuan task for Walmart, football or apparel 
retailers to attempt to monitor each of their suppliers even once yearly.  Even if all 
suppliers covered by a CoC were monitored, it would result in wasted resources as 
some suppliers deal with more than one MNC; MNCs may use different 
organizations, consultants or internal personnel for monitoring resulting in 
overlapping and redundant monitoring. 
There is also an issue with transparency of the auditing process.  Many audits 
provide aggregate data which does not link a specific supplier to a specific 
violation.
17
  Thus information which would allow the state to enforce its own laws is 
                                                          
  13 Stephanie Clifford & Steven Greenhouse, Fast and Flawed Inspections of Factories 
Abroad, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/business/global/superficial-visits-and-trickery-undermine-
foreign-factory-
inspections.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C{%221%2
2%3A%22RI%3A7%22}&_r=0. 
  14 See Apply to Be a Supplier, WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/suppliers/apply-
to-be-a-supplier/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2014). 
  15 Axel Marx & Jan Wouters, Redesigning Enforcement in Private Regulation – The 
Case of International Labor Governance 7 (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Stud., 
Working Paper No. 126, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2371212. 
  16 Factory Growth in Bangladesh, BANGLADESH MERGERS AND EXPORTERS ASS’N, 
http://www.bgmea.com.bd/chart_test/factory_growth_in_bangladesh (last visited Sept. 9, 
2014). 
  17 See, e.g., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC (STANFORD LAW 
SCHOOL) & WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, MONITORING IN THE DARK, at vi, 76 (2013), 
http://humanrightsclinic.law.stanford.edu/project/monitoring-in-the-dark/; Scott Nova & Isaac 
Shapiro, Apple’s Self-Reporting on Suppliers’ Labor Practices Shows Violations Remain 
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withheld and enforcement falls on private actors.  As will be discussed in the next 
section, even where effective monitoring occurs private enforcement is problematic. 
Moreover monitoring provides a snapshot picture.  Compliance is measured at 
one point in time.  For example, a fire at a garment factory in Karachi killed almost 
300 workers.  All but one exit door had been locked and all the windows were 
barred.  Three weeks previously the factory had been certified as meeting worker 
safety standards under SA8000 as set by Social Accountability International, which 
is seen by many as the gold standard for workplace certification.
18
 
Monitoring mechanisms may also be ineffective at identifying problems.  For 
example, an early version of Nike’s Code of Conduct included a standard for its 
contractors to certify that they comply with minimum wage laws and other labor 
standards.
19
  However, it was not until 1998, after being subjected to criticism of its 
contractors for failing to pay minimum wages, child labor and other labor abuses, 
that Nike announced its intent to implement a more effective and independent 
monitoring system.
20
 
Similarly Apple adopted a CoC in 2005 and self-monitored its contractors’ 
compliance.  As early as 2006 Boston Common Asset Management had raised 
concerns with Apple about abusive working conditions at Foxconn, an Apple 
contractor in China.
21
  In 2009-10 the New York Times published several articles 
concerning worker suicides at Apple contractor facilities in China that were 
attributed by some to work pressures including excessive overtime.
22
  In May 2011 
                                                                                                                                         
Common: Mixed Results on Labor and Human Rights, No Overall Progress in Health 
and Safety, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/apples-
reporting-suppliers-labor-practices/. 
  18 AFL-CIO, RESPONSIBILITY OUTSOURCED: SOCIAL AUDITS, 
WORKPLACE CERTIFICATION AND TWENTY YEARS OF FAILURE TO 
PROTECT WORKER RIGHTS 7 (2013), 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/77061/1902391/CSReport.pdf. 
  19  Nike Code of Conduct, http://business.nmsu.edu~dboje/NIKcodeconduct.html (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2014); Richard M. Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring 
Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 8-9 (2007).  
  20  John H. Cushman Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S. Rules Abroad, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1998, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/business/international-business-nike-pledges-to-end-
child-labor-and-
applyusrulesabroad.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%221%2 
2%3A%22RI%3A7%22}&pagewanted=print. 
  21  Press Release, Boston Common Asset Management, Boston Common Engages Apple 
Inc., http://www.bostoncommonasset.com/news/press/apple-engagement.php (last visited Sept. 
12, 2014).  (BCAM is an investment management firm specializing in socially responsible 
investment strategies). 
  22  David Barboza, IPhone Maker in China Is Under Fire After a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/technology/companies/27apple.html?pagewanted=all&a
mp;mod&_r=0; David Barboza, Another Death at Electronics Supplier in China, N.Y. 
TIMES, May, 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/technology/22suicide.html?module=Search&amp;mabR
eward=r; David Barboza, After Suicides, Scrutiny of China’s Grim Factories, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 6, 2010, available at 
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the New York Times printed an article about an explosion at a Foxconn factory 
caused by combustible dust.
23
  Seven months later a similar combustible dust 
explosion occurred at another Apple contractor plant in China.
24
  In January 2012 the 
New York Times published a major piece on worker abuses in Apple contractor 
plants in China.
25
  Finally, in February 2012, Apple responded by announcing that it 
would employ an outside monitoring group to inspect its Chinese factories.
26
 
Monitoring by outside organizations or individuals who are unfamiliar with the 
day- today operations of a supplier, however, does not necessarily produce better 
auditing results.  A BBC investigative reporter went undercover as a buyer at a 
garment factory in Dhaka where he asked the owner about work hours.  He was 
shown time sheets indicating that the work day ended at 5:30 p.m.  The day before, 
however, he had sat outside the factory from 7 a.m., when the workers entered, until 
2:30 a.m. the next day when he finally saw the workers leave.
27
 Similarly, a factory 
which had been certified as compliant with Walmart’s CoC merely moved goods 
made at a noncompliant subcontractor’s factory and presented them for approval at 
its own factory.
28
  A study of the monitoring practices of PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
concluded that while the auditors found “minor problems in the factories. . . , they 
consistently overlooked larger, more important issues. PWC’s audit reports glossed 
over problems with freedom of association and collective bargaining, overlooked 
serious violations of health and safety standards, and failed to report common 
problems in wages and hours.”29 
Even when CoCs include protection of FOA and CB, monitoring does not appear 
to be effective at determining compliance.  In the last 6 years Apple has reported 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/business/global/07suicide.html?pagewanted=all&amp;m
odule 
  23  David Barboza, Explosion at Apple Supplier Caused by Dust, China Says, 
N.Y.TIMES, May 24, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/business/global/07suicide.html?pagewanted=all&amp;m
odule.  
  24  61 Workers Injured in Explosion at Shanghai Apple Supplier, CHINA LABOR 
WATCH, December 19, 2011, http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/newscast/160. 
  25  Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, the Human Costs that are Built into an 
iPad, N.Y.TIMES, January 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-
for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all. 
  26  Steven Greenhouse, Critics Question Record of Monitor Selected by Apple, N.Y. 
TIMES, February 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/technology/critics-question-record-of-fair-labor-
association-apples-monitor.html. 
  27  Richard Bilton, Bangladeshi factory workers locked in on 19-hour shifts, BBC NEWS, 
September 23, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24195441. 
  28 Clifford & Greenhouse, supra note 13. 
  29  Dara O’Rourke, MONITORING THE MONITORS: A CRITIQUE OF 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (PWC) LABOR MONITORING 7 (2000), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/dorourke/www/PDF/pwc.pdf. 
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over 95% compliance with FOA and CB
30
 in supplier practices even though 44% of 
its suppliers are located in China
31
 which does not allow for true freedom of 
association – by law all trade unions in China must be affiliated with the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions.
32
  The FLA states that it monitors for FOA, yet in 2004 
it “did not detect a single violation of the union blacklisting benchmark in all the 
factories that they audited in the world.  In that same year, the U.S. State Department 
found strong evidence of union blacklisting in apparel export zones in regions such 
as Central America.”33 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT 
An initial problem with enforcing CoCs is the nature of MNC supply chains.  A 
former Apple executive was quoted in the New York Times: “You can set all the 
rules you want, but they’re meaningless if you don’t give suppliers enough profit to 
treat workers well. . . .  If you squeeze margins you’re forcing them to cut safety.”34  
Similarly a report issued by Stanford Law School and the Worker Rights Consortium 
noted that “buyers must adjust their purchasing practices if significant improvements 
in factory conditions are to be achieved and sustained.”35 Purchasing models which 
shift the cost for compliance down the supply chain while demanding short turn-
around times, and offering slim profit margins with no long-term commitments 
provide little incentive for contractors to invest in improvements.
36
 
Moreover, while not unheard of, it is rare for companies to terminate supplier 
contracts even in the face of non-compliance with their CoCs.
37
  According to a 
former Apple executive “We’ve known about labor abuses in some factories for four 
                                                          
  30 APPLE, Supplier Responsibility 2014 Progress Report 32, 
https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2014_Progress_Report.pdf; 
Supplier Responsibility 2013 Progress Report 29, https://www.apple.com/supplier-
responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2013_Progress_Report.pdf; Supplier Responsibility 2012 
Progress Report 7, https://www.apple.com/supplier-
responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2012_Progress_Report.pdf; Supplier Responsibility 2011 
Progress Report 15, https://www.apple.com/supplier-
responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2011_Progress_Report.pdf. 
  31  See APPLE, Supplier map, https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/our-
suppliers/. 
  32  See Ronald C. Brown, Understanding Labor And Employment Law In China 44 
(2010). 
  33  Anner, supra note 7, at 620. 
  34  Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 25. See also AFL-CIO, supra note 18, at 9. 
  35 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC (STANFORD 
LAW SCHOOL) & WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, supra note 17, at v. 
  36  Witte, supra note 8 at 67; See also Jeff Vogt, Bangladesh and the Labour Law (May 22, 
2013), http://www.ituc-csi.org/Bangladesh-and-the-labour-law. 
  37  See, Margeret Levi et al., Aligning Rights and Interests: Why, When and How to 
Uphold Labor Standards 23 (2013), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNWDR2013/Resources/8258024-
1320950747192/8260293-1320956712276/8261091-
1348683883703/WDR2013_bp_Aligning_Rights_and_Incentives.pdf. 
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years, and they’re still going on.  Why?  Because the system works for us.  Suppliers 
would change tomorrow if Apple told them they didn’t have another choice.”38 
This reluctance by some MNCs to enforce labor standards was evidenced in the 
aftermath of the Rana Plaza factory collapse.
39
  Many European MNCs agreed to an 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety which had been negotiated with input from 
Global Union Federations.
40
  Most American MNCs refused to sign this Accord, 
instead drawing up their own “commitment” to ensure worker safety.41  One of the 
differences between the two documents is enforceability: the Accord is enforceable 
through binding arbitration; the American agreement provides for no enforcement 
mechanism.
42
 
Recent protests involving garment workers in Cambodia also illustrates this 
corporate reluctance to enforce their stated commitment to worker rights.  From late 
2013 to early 2014 there were ongoing protests by apparel workers in Cambodia 
fighting for an increase in the minimum wage. These protests were met with police 
violence resulting in the shooting deaths of several workers.
43
  In response, several 
                                                          
  38  Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 25; But see, David Barboza, Samsung Contractor 
Suspended Over Child Labor Allegations, N. Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, at B7. It should be 
noted, however, that the news story indicates the supplier was only temporarily suspended and 
that if the investigation discloses under-age workers were hired illegally the contractor “could 
be permanently barred from working with Samsung.” Supra. 
  39  Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores 
Dead, N.Y.TIMES, April 24, 2013, at A1 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-
collapse.html?pagewanted; See also, Associated Press, Death Toll in Bangladesh Passes 
1,100, N.Y.TIMES, May 11, 2013, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/world/asia/death-toll-in-bangladesh-collapse.html. 
  40  See Steven Greenhouse, Major Retailers Join Bangladesh Safety Plan, N. Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/business/global/hm-
agrees-to-bangladesh-safety-plan.html?. Global Union Federations are international trade 
union organizations which bring together national unions from various countries which 
represent workers in a specific economic sector. 
  41  See Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Retailers See Big Risk in Safety Plan for Factories in 
Bangladesh, N. Y. TIMES, May 23, 2013, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/business/legal-experts-debate-us-retailers-risks-of-
signing-bangladesh-accord.html?pagewanted=all; See also, Steven Greenhouse  & Stephanie 
Clifford, U.S. Retailers Offer Plan for Safety at Factories, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/global/us-retailers-offer-safety-
plan-for-bangladeshi-factories.html?pagewanted=all. 
  42  Two Plans for Safety at Bangladesh Factories, N.Y. TIMES, September 1, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/01/business/global/inspections-
comparison.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%221%22%3A%22RI%3A
7%22}; See also, Comparison: The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the 
Gap/Walmart Scheme, available at, 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/background/comparison-safety-accord-and-the-gap-
walmart-scheme. 
  43  Cambodia police clash with protesters at Nike contractor, BBC NEWS ASIA, June 3, 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22757730; See also, One killed in Cambodia 
garments worker protest violence, BBC NEWS ASIA, November 12, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24910835; See also, Cambodia garment workers killed 
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MNC clothing retailers addressed a letter to the Cambodian government protesting 
the violence and urging the government to negotiate a raise for the workers.  
However, when a Voice of America reporter contacted the companies they indicated 
that “they did not plan to stop buying goods from Cambodia if the minimum wage is 
not raised or violence against workers continues.”44 
In the face of MNC hesitancy to impose significant costs on noncompliant 
contractors, third parties have attempted to enforce the terms of CoCs.  The results 
present a mixed bag.  In Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
45
 the plaintiffs, employees of 
foreign contractors of Wal-Mart whose contracts included a CoC, brought, inter alia, 
a breach of contract claim against Wal-Mart for failing to enforce the terms of the 
CoC.  The contract claim was based on a third-party beneficiary theory.  Specifically 
the alleged breach was Wal-Mart’s failure to conduct adequate on-site inspections 
and the contractors’ failure to ensure that working conditions complied with the 
CoC.  First, the Court held that the language in the CoC  – “Wal-Mart will undertake 
affirmative measures, such as on-site inspection. . .to monitor said standards” –  did 
not create a promise to monitor.  Thus no promise was breached. Secondly, the 
Court found that Wal-Mart was the promisee with respect to the contractors’ promise 
to comply with labor standards and thus the plaintiffs could not claim beneficiary 
status vis-a-vis Wal-Mart since beneficiaries can make the claim only as against the 
promisor.
46
 
A slightly different claim was raised by the University of Wisconsin in a motion 
for a declaratory judgment filed against Adidas alleging breach of a product 
licensing agreement.
47
  The University alleged that its contract with Adidas 
incorporated a labor code of conduct which required, inter alia, that Adidas “shall 
provide legally mandated benefits” to workers where their apparel is produced and 
that, while Addias may subcontract work, it still remained responsible for ensuring 
that goods are manufactured per the license agreement.  One of Adidas’ 
subcontractors closed its Indonesian factory yet failed to pay the workers severance 
pay required by domestic law.  The University asked the court to interpret the 
contract as requiring Adidas to ensure the severance payments are made.
48
  Adidas’ 
position was that its obligation under the contract only required it to cease doing 
business with any contractor which failed to abide by the labor code of conduct.
49
  
Adidas received its last shipment from the contractor before the latter failed to make 
                                                                                                                                         
in clashes with police, BBC NEWS ASIA, January 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-25585054. 
  44  Kimseng Men, World Retailers Want Negotiations in Cambodia Labor Dispute, 
VOICE OF AMERICA (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1827740.html. 
  45  Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 679-681 (9th Cir. 2009). 
  46  Id. at 681-682. 
  47  Summons, Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Adidas 
America, Inc., No. 12CV2775 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 2012). 
  48  Id. 
  49  Letter with attachment from Paul E. Loving, Special Counsel, Adidas, to Brian D. 
Vaughan, Senior University Legal Counsel, University of Wisconsin-Madison (February 2, 
2012) (on file with author). 
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required payments to its employees.  Since Adidas had ceased doing business with 
the contractor it fully complied with its obligations under its contract with the 
University.
50
  A court judgment on the issue was avoided when the University and 
Adidas reached a settlement where the latter agreed to make a financial contribution 
toward payment of severance owed.
51
 
Aside from the practical problems with enforcement, there are philosophical 
objections. As noted, both monitoring and enforcement are to a large extent reactions 
to public pressure, not proactive.  Thus, situations that do not make “front page 
headlines” but still impact the lives of workers may often not be addressed.  For 
example, it was not until over 1100 workers died in the Rana Plaza collapse in April 
2013 that MNCs reached an enforceable agreement on fire and safety standards in 
the Bangladeshi garment industry.  In the three years prior to Rana Plaza, however, 
at least 235 workers died in Bangladeshi garment factory fires or building 
collapses.
52
  Had those earlier incidents incited the kind of public outcry produced by 
the Rana Plaza tragedy, 1100 workers might still be alive. 
A corollary problem with public outrage as the impetus for enforcement concerns 
the types of issues most likely to engage public sympathy.  Worker deaths and child 
labor can easily strike a public nerve; such fervor is rarely seen when the issue 
involves the workers’ right to form a trade union. Yet, as noted previously, the 
empowerment of workers within the workplace to speak up and hold the employer 
accountable for workplace conditions may be the best way to ensure on a continuous 
basis that health and safety issues are addressed and domestic laws relating to child 
labor and working hours are complied with.
53
 
Finally, to the extent that CoCs address the core ILO labor standards and are 
actually enforced, their effectiveness is limited to the specific company or factory 
subject to the terms of the CoC.  Similarly any protection from CoCs are also 
generally limited to workers in the sector of the economy which does business with 
MNCs.  So while garment workers in Bangladesh may enjoy the benefits of health 
and safety protections due to the recently agreed-to Accord on Fire and Building 
Safety, these protections will not necessarily be extended to workers in, for example, 
the Bangladesh shrimp industry.
54
  A similar case in point is the Rugmark campaign, 
a product labeling program which certifies that rugs made in Southeast Asia have not 
                                                          
  50  Id. 
  51  See, Karen Herzog UW-Madison drops suit against Adidas over treatment of workers, 
JOURNAL SENTINEL, June 3, 2013, available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/209952971.html.; Cf. James J. Brudney, Envisioning 
Enforcement of Freedom of Association Standards in Corporate Codes of Conduct: A Journey 
for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 555, 576 et seq. (2011-
2012)(discussion of other possible judicial enforcement options). 
  52  Timeline: Deadly factory accidents in Bangladesh, CBC NEWS, Oct 9, 2013, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/timeline-bangladesh. 
  53  See David Weill, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20 
(1991). A study of OSHA health and safety inspection and enforcement data with respect to 
U.S. manufacturing facilities revealed that the probability of an inspection, the intensity of the 
inspection and the gravity of the penalty all increased in unionized workplaces. 
  54  Our Mission is to Protect People and Planet, ENVTL. JUST. FOUND. (2014), 
http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/files/public/Impossibly_Cheap_Web.pdf, detailing the 
health and safety issues confronting workers in that industry. 
2014] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 11 
 
used child labor.
55
  While this campaign has had some success in reducing child 
labor in the carpet industry, as of 2009-10 there were still 4.98 million child workers 
in India
56
 – they may not be weaving rugs, but they are making bricks, working in 
agriculture or employed as street vendors. 
Given these problems with the CoC system, are there other options?  And if so, 
are they more effective?  While there are many possible mechanisms, this article will 
focus on three options: International Framework Agreements (IFAs), the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
V. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS 
 IFAs are a response to globalization and the rise of MNCs.
57
  “An international 
(or global) framework agreement (IFA) is an instrument negotiated between a 
multinational enterprise and a Global Union Federation (GUF) in order to establish 
an ongoing relationship between the parties and ensure that the company respects the 
same standards in all the countries where it operates.”58  All IFAs include a 
commitment by the signatory MNC to respect the ILO core labor standards which 
include FOA and CB.  Additionally most contain provisions concerning working 
conditions (health and safety) and wages and hours.
59
 
 In terms of coverage, there are currently more than 100 IFAs which cover about 
9 million workers.
60
  With few exceptions, IFAs cover the entire operations of an 
MNC (including subsidiaries).  69% of IFAs apply in some manner to the suppliers 
and contractors of the MNC – 9% directly apply to the entire supply chain; 14% 
require the MNC to take measures to ensure supplier/contractor compliance; and 
46% require the MNC to encourage suppliers/contractors to comply.  31% of IFAs 
apply solely to the MNC’s own operations and do not include suppliers or 
                                                          
  55  See Welcome to Rugmark India, RUGMARK FOUND. INDIA (2012), 
http://www.rugmarkindia.org/Rugmark/index.htm. 
  56  NSSO Data on Child Labour, MINISTRY OF LAB. & EMP. (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://labour.gov.in/content/division/nsso-data-on-child-labour.php. 
  57  For a history of the evolution of IFAs see Dan Gallin, International Framework 
Agreements: A reassessment, in CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FRAMEWORK? (Konstantinos Papadakis ed., 2008), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/ wcms_093423.pdf. 
  58  International Framework Agreements: A Global Tool for Supporting Rights at Work, 
INT’L LAB. ORG. (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_080723/lang--en/index.htm. 
  59  Renée-Claude Drouin, Promoting Fundamental Labor Rights Through International 
Framework Agreements: Practical Outcomes and Present Challenges, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 591, 594-95 (2010). 
  60  Framework Agreements, GLOBAL UNIONS, http://www.global-unions.org/+-framework-
agreements-+.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014); César F. Rosado Marzán, Labor’s Soft Means 
and Hard Challenges: Fundamental Discrepancies and the Promise of Non-Binding 
Arbitration for International Framework Agreements, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2014). 
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contractors.
61
  Finally, the majority of IFAs are concluded with European-based 
MNCs, although there are a few non-European signatories.
62
 
 Unlike CoCs, IFAs are the result of bilateral negotiations between MNCs and 
worker representatives allowing for workers themselves to identify the important 
workplace issues.  The process also strengthens and legitimizes the union as an 
institution which can play a positive role in insuring adherence to the terms of the 
agreement.  Like CoCs, however, the impact of IFAs is limited to particular 
companies and sectors of the economy. 
 The first IFA was negotiated in 1998 between the International Union of Food 
and Allied Workers’ Association and BSN (Danone).63  The growth in the use of 
IFAs has lagged behind the adoption of CoCs.  In 2002 there were 27 IFAs
64
 
whereas at that point over 1,000 MNCs had CoCs.
65
  Even today there are only a few 
more than 100 MNCs which are signatories to IFAs.
66
  Thus, the impact from 
enforcement of IFAs is likely more limited vis-a-vis CoCs given the lower 
participation rate. 
 With regard to enforcement, there are no reported cases of court litigation related 
to IFAs. Indeed, several commentators have expressed the view that judicial 
enforcement of IFAs is problematic.
67
  While legal enforceability is unclear at this 
point, the fact is that one of the parties to the process, the union, has a self-interest in 
effectively enforcing the IFA; in the case of CoCs it is not readily apparent that 
either party to the agreement – the MNC or the supplier -- has such an interest. 
 The wording of IFAs themselves indicates methods of implementation short of 
judicial enforcement.  Some agreements rely on the good faith between the parties.  
For example, the 2004 IFA between H&M and Union Network International 
provides that the parties “will bear joint responsibility for the full implementation in 
good faith of this agreement. . .”68  Other IFAs provide for discussions between 
union and company representatives regarding compliance; the 2012 Ford-
International Metalworkers Federation IFA provides that “compliance. . .can be 
raised and discussed between the Company and the Union in the Regions or at the 
Ford Global Information Sharing Forum.  When issues are identified, the parties will 
                                                          
  61  Volker Telljohann Et Al., EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS: 
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES 32 (2009).  See also, Drouin, supra 
note 59 at 621 et seq. 
  62  See Framework Agreements, supra note 60 for list of IFA signatories. 
  63  Gallin, supra note 57 at 26. 
  64  Telljohann, supra note 61 at 21 Figure 1. 
  65  Witte, supra note 8 at 53. 
  66  Framework Agreements, supra note 60. 
  67 See e.g., Brian Burkett, International Framework Agreements: An Emerging 
International Regulatory Approach or a Passing European Phenomenon?, 16 CAN. LAB. & 
EMP.  L.J. 81, 92 et seq (2011); but see, Alvin L. Goldman, Enforcement of International 
Framework Agreements Under U.S. Law, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 605 (2011-2012). 
  68  Agreement Between H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M) and Union Network 
International (UNI), HM (Jan. 14, 2004), 
about.hm.com/content/dam/hm/about/documents/masterlanguage/CSR/Policies/RM_UNI_AN
D_HM_LINK_1178884959035.pdf. 
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work together to find mutual solutions.”69  Some IFAs create committees to oversee 
compliance; the International Union of Foodworkers-Chiquita agreement requires 
the parties to “appoint up to four members to a Review Committee that will meet 
periodically to oversee the application of this agreement...”70  More recently, a few 
IFAs have included arbitration clauses.  The 2008 IFA between ISS and UNI Global 
Union creates a multi-step dispute process which culminates in binding arbitration.
71
 
 Given the private nature of implementation mechanisms, information regarding 
the effectiveness of IFAs in protecting working rights is largely anecdotal. What this 
episodic evidence indicates is that IFAs have been mainly successful in creating 
transnational union cooperation which can be used to address local problems, in 
particular employer resistance to trade union organizing campaigns. For example, in 
2010 workers at an Illinois plant which had been recently purchased by Rhodia, a 
French chemicals company, sought representation by the United Steelworkers union 
(USW).  The US plant managers engaged in an anti-union campaign. USW officials 
contacted the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and Mine Workers’ 
Union (ICEM) which had an IFA with Rhodia.  The agreement provided that Rhodia 
would respect the right of employees to unionize and would remain neutral.  ICEM 
informed Rhodia of the problems at the US plant and Rhodia’s CEO instructed the 
US managers to cease anti-union activity.  USW won the subsequent representation 
election.
72
 
 A similar anti-union campaign against the Machinists Union (IAM) was waged 
by local management at a plant in Virginia which was an IKEA subsidiary.  IKEA 
was a party to an IFA with the Building and Woodworkers’ International (BWI) 
which provided that IKEA would allow its workers to join a union. Communication 
between the IAM, BWI and IKEA led the latter, after some initial delay, to rein in its 
U.S. managers and the IAM eventually won a representation election in 2011.
73
 
 While IFAs appear to be more effective at protecting FOA rights than CoCs, 
there is no evidence that these agreements are better at protecting other labor 
standards.
74
  As mentioned previously, however, protection of FOA empowers 
                                                          
  69  International Framework Agreement Ford Motor Company and Global IMF/Ford 
Global Information Sharing Network, GLOBAL UNIONS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.global-
unions.org/IMG/pdf/ifa_ford.pdf. 
  70  IUF/Colsiba and Chiquita Agreement on Freedom of Association, Minimum Labour 
Standards and Employment in Latin American Banana Operations, IUF (May 11, 2001), 
http://www.iufdocuments.org/www/documents/Chiquita-e.pdf. 
  71  ISS-UNI Global Agreement, UNI GLOBAL UNION (2008),  
http://place.uniglobalunion.org/LotusQuickr/pub/PageLibraryC1257824003A7C09.nsf/h_C58
49 
38BF113738FC12578AA004FD1D8/3E1939837F766C41C12578AA0050B203/?OpenDocum
ent; For a general discussion of IFA enforcement mechanisms see Drouin, supra note 59 at 
618-21; and Telljohann et al, supra note 61 at 33-6. 
  72  Dick Blin, Global Framework Agreements: Compliance, 18 INT’L UNION RTS.  3, 4 
(2011). 
  73  Dimitris Stevis & Michael Fichter, International Framework Agreements in the United 
States: Escaping, Projecting, or Globalizing Social Dialogues?  33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 
667, 686 (2012). 
  74  Drouin, supra note 59, at 610. 
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workers to seek and enforce the protections of other labor rights. But given the 
limited number of IFAs as well as the episodic evidence of their effectiveness, it 
would be hard to argue that IFAs are a better mechanism for ensuring protection of 
worker rights than CoCs. 
VI.  GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
 The U.S. GSP program was established in 1974 and authorized the President to 
grant duty-free treatment to imports from developing countries which are designated 
as beneficiaries.
75
  This allows the designated countries to export their goods into the 
U.S. market at a competitive advantage vis-a-vis both developed countries and non-
designated developing countries (which latter groups are required to pay prevailing 
tariffs whenever exporting their goods to the U.S.).  In 1984 new language was 
added to the GSP program, requiring that beneficiaries must respect enumerated 
worker rights in order to maintain their duty-free status: “...the President shall not 
designate any country as a beneficiary developing country...if such country has not 
taken, or is not taking, steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to 
workers in the country....” These internationally recognized worker rights include 
FOA and CB as well as standards relating to forced labor, child labor and acceptable 
working conditions with respect to minimum wages, hours of work and occupational 
safety and health.
76
 
 As indicated, the standard for determining whether to designate a developing 
country as a GSP beneficiary is whether the country has taken, or is taking, steps to 
comply with the labor standards.  Therefore, even if a country is not in full 
compliance with the enumerated labor standards, it may still be eligible for GSP if it 
demonstrates that it is taking steps to comply. 
 An annual review process determines if a country is in compliance with GSP 
conditions. Petitions to review the worker rights practices of a particular beneficiary 
are submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative. Petitions may be filed by any 
interested party, but the most active organizations involved in submitting petitions 
have been the AFL-CIO, the International Labor Research and Education Fund, the 
Lawyers Committee on Human Rights and Human Rights Watch. The petitions are 
reviewed by the GSP Subcommittee which decides whether to accept or reject the 
petition. Over a ten year period (1985 - 1996) 82 petitions were filed alleging worker 
rights violations, 47 of which were accepted for review.
77
 
 If a petition is accepted, a one-year review is conducted based on an analysis of 
data received from a variety of sources.  After reviewing the information, the 
Subcommittee determines if a country is taking steps to afford worker rights.  It can 
                                                          
  75  Vivian C. Jones, Cong. Res. Serv., Generalized System of Preferences: 
Background and Renewal Debate, 1 (2014) available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33663.pdf. Authorization for the GSP program 
expired on July 31, 2013 and has not yet been renewed. Id. 
  76  Bama Athreya, U.S. Dept. of Lab., Bureau of Int'l Lab. Aff., Comparative Case 
Analysis of the Impacts of Trade-Related Labor Provisions on Select US Trade 
Preference Recipient Countries, 1-3 (2011) available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/2010ILRF.pdf. 
  77  Kimberly Ann Elliott, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Preferences for Workers? Worker 
Rights and the US Generalized System of Preference, tbl.4 (May 8, 2000), (transcript 
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=313). 
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recommend to the President that s/he: 1) extend the review process so that the 
Subcommittee may continue its investigation; 2) terminate the review because the 
country has “taken steps” to comply or 3) suspend or revoke the country’s eligibility 
for benefits.  The President makes the ultimate decision about whether to suspend a 
country’s eligibility.78  During the life of this program, approximately fourteen 
countries have had their eligibility suspended due to failure to comply with labor 
standards.
79
  Since 1987, 23 countries have been under continuing review for various 
periods of time.
80
 
 Within the US GSP regime, a study of 40 cases which were reviewed for labor 
rights violations between 1985-1996 found that in 15 cases respect for worker rights 
improved due to the GSP review process, and in 17 cases there was no change in 
worker rights.
81
  Of the latter 17 cases, “12 resulted in suspension or termination of 
GSP eligibility”.82 
 Some commentators have suggested that even when petitions are ultimately 
rejected or review is continued for years until the case is closed, the pressure of the 
petition itself and US government review often brings about improvements, even if 
not at the hoped-for level.
83
  Some examples of the impact of GSP include a petition 
filed in 1993 by the AFL-CIO alleging that Costa Rica permitted the use of 
management-supported trade unions; the government enacted legislation banning 
such organizations (called “solidarista”) from engaging in collective bargaining and 
the AFL-CIO withdrew its petition.
84
  In 1996 Cambodia applied for GSP status and 
the AFL-CIO protested that its labor code did not protect worker rights.  Cambodia 
enacted a new labor code and was granted GSP beneficiary status.
85
  In 2008 the 
                                                          
  78  Athreya, supra note 76. 
  79  Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of 
Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 199, 209 n.39 (2001). 
Subsequently, Bangladesh was suspended in 2013. Id.; See Rosella Brevetti, Obama Orders 
Suspension of Bangladesh from GSP Because of Worker Rights Issues, 124 Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) A-17 (June 27, 2013). 
  80  Compa & Vogt, supra note 79 at 209 n.38; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Results 
of the 2012 GSP Annual Review, 16 (2013) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20AR%20Results%20List_0.pdf. 
  81  Elliott, supra note 77, tbl.7.  In the remaining 8 cases reviewed, improvements 
occurred after domestic political change and thus the improvement could not be attributed to 
the GSP process. Id. at 6. 
  82  Id. at 6. 
  83  See generally, id.; Compa & Vogt, supra note 79; Athreya, supra note 76; Witte, supra 
note 8, at 44-46; OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core 
Workers' Rights and International Trade,  186 (1996), available at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/trade/trade-employment-and-
labour-standards_9789264104884-en#page1. 
  84  U.S. Dept. of State, Country Commercial Guides FY 1999: Costa Rica, 
http://www.state.gov/1997-2001 
NOPDFS/about_state/business/com_guides/1999/wha/costar99_03.html. 
  85  Asian AFL-CIO Affiliate May Recommend Opposition To GSP Benefits For 
Cambodia, 313 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6 (Nov. 4, 1996); Daniel Pruzin, Cambodia Adopts 
2014] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 16 
 
AFL-CIO filed a petition to withdraw GSP status from Sri Lanka for failure to 
protect worker rights.  After a 4 year review period, the case was closed based on the 
government’s efforts to address the issues contained in the petition, including 
investigating and resolving unfair labor practice cases and enacting legislation to 
increase fines for violations.
86
 
 The European Union GSP includes both sanctions for worker rights offenses and 
incentives for compliance.  The law provides that the European Union will suspend 
benefits if a beneficiary country engages in any form of forced labor, the export of 
goods made by prison labor, or if a country engages in systematic and serious 
violations of core ILO labor standards. On the other hand, additional incentives 
(GSP+) are offered to countries which comply with the principles enshrined in the 
core ILO Conventions.  The incentives consist in an additional tariff reduction of 
20%.
87
  The European Commission has suspended two countries for violations of 
worker rights – Myanmar (for forced labor) and Belarus (for repression of trade 
unions).
88
 
 From a coverage perspective, the GSP enforcement mechanism has the potential 
to improve worker rights throughout the beneficiary country, not just in one 
company or one sector of the economy. Country coverage is relatively extensive as 
well.  Under the US program, 180 countries are eligible to apply for GSP beneficiary 
status;
89
 under the EU’s newly revised program, 90 countries qualify.90 
 In terms of enforcement, parties with a self-interest in ensuring compliance with 
labor standards (i.e. trade unions and human rights NGOs) have access to the petition 
process to initiate review.  Moreover, both the US and EU have shown a willingness 
to activate the enforcement mechanism and cut off GSP trade benefits for non-
complying countries, thus creating a credible incentive for countries to comply.  As 
has been mentioned by several commentators, however, suspension of GSP is often 
                                                                                                                                         
New Labor Law On Eve Of Visit By U.S. Delegation, 10 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Jan. 15, 
1997). 
  86  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Closes GSP Worker 
Rights Review of Sri Lanka: Preference Program Helps Promote Progress on Labor Issues, 
(June 29, 2012), (available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2012/july/ustr-closes-gsp-worker-rights-review-sri-lanka). 
  87  See European Commission, The European Union's Generalised System of 
Preferences (2004), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_116448.pdf. 
  88  Press Release, European Commission, European Commission proposes to reinstate 
trade preferences to Myanmar/Burma (Sept. 27, 2012) (available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12 971_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
12-971_en.htm) (Myanmar was subsequently reinstated); see ITUC, Suspension of EU trade 
preference to Belarus, ITUC General Council urges the government to implement 
international labour standards, (June 2, 2007), http://www.ituc-csi.org/suspension-of-eu-
trade-preferences. 
  89  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 
Guidebook, 18 (2013), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GSP%20Guidebook_Final_06262013.pdf. 
  90  Memorandum from European Comm’n, Revised EU trade scheme to help developing 
countries applies on 1 January 2014 (Dec. 19, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-1187_en.htm). 
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influenced not only by compliance with labor standards but also by foreign policy 
objectives.
91
 
 An additional positive effect of GSP programs vis-a-vis CoCs is that elected 
governments, rather than private actors, are determining the appropriate rights on 
which to focus, with a reliance on core ILO standards, including in particular FOA 
and CB. 
VII.  FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 Free trade agreements (FTAs) are bilateral or multilateral agreements between 
nation- state trading partners to eliminate some or all tariffs in order to encourage 
economic activity. While FTAs have been around for some time, only recently have 
such agreements included labor standards.  As early as 1973 the EU entered into 
FTAs with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland;
92
 the first US FTA was signed with 
Israel in 1985.
93
  The 1993 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC) negotiated as a side agreement to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) was the first FTA with a labor provision.
94
  By June, 2013, 58 
FTAs included labor provisions covering 120 countries.
95
 
 Throughout the years, there has been an evolution in the content of the labor 
provisions in US FTAs.
96
  In NAALC, for example, the parties agreed to enforce 
their domestic labor legislation and to promote specified labor standards which 
included the ILO core standards as well as safety and health in the workplace and 
protection for migrant workers.
97
  The next group of FTAs contained a commitment 
to strive to ensure ILO core labor standards are recognized and protected by 
domestic law and that each party will effectively enforce its labor laws.
98
  The third 
                                                          
  91  Witte, supra note 8, at 44; Compa & Vogt, supra note 79, at 237. 
  92  See WORLD TRADE ORG., List of Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the World 
Trade Organization, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 
2014). 
  93  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Israel Free Trade Agreement, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/israel-fta (last visited Aug. 22, 
2014). 
  94  Int’l Labour Org., Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements (2013), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
inst/documents/publication/wcms_228965.pdf. 
  95  Id. at 5. 
  96  See Robert A. Rogowsky & Eric Chyn, U.S. Trade Law and FTAs: A Survey of Labor 
Requirements, J. OF INT’L COMM. & ECON., Jul. 2007, available at 
http://www.cpdcngo.org/cpdc/attachments/article/96/trade_law_ftas_8_.pdf. 
  97  North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1-
3 & Annex , Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993). 
  98  See, Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, art. 6 ¶s 1 & 3, Oct, 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63; 
Free Trade Agreement, US-Morocco, arts. 16.1(2) & 16.2(a), June 15, 2004, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text;  Free 
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Australia, arts. 18.1(2) & 18.2(1)(a), May 18, 2004, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file148_5
1 68.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.- Bahrain, arts. 15.1(2) & 15.2(1)(a), Jan 11, 2006, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text;   Central 
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group require the parties to adopt laws which protect the core ILO labor rights and to 
effectively enforce domestic labor laws.
99
 
 Within the EU, early FTAs mention some specific social issues such as social 
welfare, migrant worker rights or non-discrimination in employment.
100
  More recent 
EU FTAs make specific reference to ILO core labor standards.
101
 
 A major difference between the US and EU approach to labor conditions in FTAs 
is implementation methods.  While the EU relies heavily on a promotional approach 
stressing consultation and technical assistance,
102
 US FTAs are more sanction-
oriented with enforcement mechanisms culminating in fines or suspension of trade 
benefits.
103
  Within US FTAs, moreover, there has been an evolution in the 
enforcement mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                         
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) arts. 16.1(2) & 16.2(1)(a), Aug. 5, 2004, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-
central-america-fta/final-text; Free Trade Agreement, US-Chile, arts. 18.1(2) & 18.2(1)(a), 
June 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; 
Free Trade Agreement, US-Oman, arts. 16.1(2) & 16.2(1)(a), Jan. 19, 2006, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text; Free Trade 
Agreement, US-Singapore, arts. 17.1(2) & 17.2(1)(a), May 6, 2003, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_
4 036.pdf. 
  99  Free Trade Agreement, US-Colombia, arts. 17.2 & 17.3, Nov. 22, 2006, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text; Free 
Trade Agreement, US-Korea, arts. 19.2 & 19.3, June 30, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text; Trade Promotion Agreement, US-
Panama, arts. 16.2 & 16.3, June 28, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/panama-tpa/final-text; Trade Partnership Agreement, US-Peru, arts. 17.2 & 17.3, 
Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text. 
  100  See e.g., Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, EU-Algeria, arts. 67 & 68, Apr. 22, 2002, 
2005 O.J. (L 265) 2, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22005A1010%2801%29&fro m=EN; Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement, EU-Morocco, arts. 69 & 71, Feb. 26, 1996, 2000 O.J. (L70) 2, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c9d6b9bf-4365-49d7-afdb-
4ce7d15eab40.0006. 02/DOC_1&format=PDF; See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 92. 
  101  See, e.g., Economic Partnership Agreement, EU-CARIFORUM States, arts. 191 & 
192, Oct. 15, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L289) I3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22008A1030%2801%29&fro m=EN; Free Trade 
Agreement, EU-Korea, art. 134(3), Oct. 6, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22011A0514%2801%29&fro m=EN; 
Trade Agreement, EU-Colombia-Peru, art. 269(3), June 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. 3, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22012A1221%2801%29&fro m=EN; see WORLD 
TRADE ORG., supra note 92. 
  102  See e.g., Int’l Labour Org., supra note 94, at 69; Evgeny Postnikov & Ida Bastiaens, 
Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU Preferential Trade 
Agreements, 21 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 923, 925 (2014). 
  103  See Mary Jane Bolle, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2013). 
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 Under NAALC, enforcement, which can be initiated by private parties for failure 
to enforce domestic labor laws, is limited to investigation and consultation.
104
  With 
regard to failure to enforce domestic safety and health law, child labor laws or 
minimum wage laws, an arbitration panel can eventually be convened which would 
issue a report and recommendations. The governments concerned may then agree on 
a plan to address the problems found by the panel. If no plan can be agreed upon, or 
if a government fails to comply with the plan, the arbitration panel can be 
reconvened and may impose a monetary penalty on the non-complying government.  
If the penalty is not paid, trade benefits can be suspended.
105
  From 1994-2008, 25 
labor communications were accepted for review and fifteen ministerial consultations 
were held.
106
  There has never been a submission for arbitration. 
 The next FTA with labor provisions was the US-Jordan FTA.  It requires that the 
parties enforce their labor laws and ensure that their laws provide for internationally 
recognized labor rights related to FOA, CB, child labor, forced labor and acceptable 
working conditions.
107
  Disputes over compliance are initially addressed through bi-
lateral consultations.  Absent settlement, the dispute can eventually be submitted to a 
dispute settlement panel which issues a non-binding report.  If the dispute remains 
unresolved, the aggrieved party may resort to sanctions.
108
  Under this agreement, 
unlike NAALC, only the governments may initiate the compliance process.  
Moreover, at the time this agreement was signed, the representatives of the 
respective governments exchanged letters indicating that they did not intend to 
invoke the dispute settlement provisions should a disagreement arise nor would they 
seek recourse to trade sanctions.
109
 
 The next seven FTAs shared the same labor and enforcement provisions. The 
parties agree to strive to establish domestic labor laws consistent with the ILO core 
labor standards and to effectively enforce such laws.
110
  Enforcement for non-
compliance culminates with a decision by an arbitral panel which can impose an 
annual monetary assessment not to exceed $15 million. This assessment is paid into 
                                                          
  104  See COMM’N FOR LAB. COOPERATION, Section III: Submission of Public 
Communications, (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) (describing the enforcement process). 
  105  See NAALC, supra note 97, at Part Five: Resolution of Disputes. 
  106  See NAALC Public Communications and Results, 1994-2008, 
http://new.naalc.org/userfiles/file/NAALC-Public-Communications-and-Results-1994-
2008.pdf. 
  107  Free Trade Agreement, US-Jordan, supra note 98, at Art. 6. 
  108  Id. at Art. 17. 
  109  Exchange of letters between Robert B Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative and 
Marwan Muahser Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the U.S. (July 23, 
2001), http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005665.asp and 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005664.asp. 
  110  Free Trade Agreement, US-Chile FTA, supra n. 98 at art. 18; Free Trade Agreement, 
US-Australia, supra n. 98 at art. 18; Free Trade Agreement, US-Bahrain, supra n. 98 at art. 
15; Free Trade Agreement, US-Oman, supra n. 98 at art. 16; Free Trade Agreement, US-
Singapore, supra n. 98 at art. 17; Free Trade Agreement, US-Morocco, supra n. 98 at art. 16; 
CAFTA, supra n. 98 at art. 16. 
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a fund to improve labor rights.  Failure to pay the assessment can result in the 
suspension of benefits.
111
 
 The most recent FTAs require that the parties adopt and maintain domestic labor 
law consistent with ILO core labor standards.
112
  In the event of non-compliance, the 
dispute may eventually be referred to arbitration and failure by the parties to agree 
on implementation of the arbitrators’ report may result in suspension of benefits.113 
 Thus, the content of the labor obligation, as well as the sanctions associated with 
non- compliance, have been progressively improved.  Moreover, with the exception 
of the US-Jordan FTA, all other FTAs have a compliance mechanism which can be 
initiated by a third party submission.
114
  What has been the track record of 
compliance? 
 A recent study determined that much of the improvement in labor standards can 
be attributed to ex ante compliance actions by nations hoping to become trade 
partners.
115
  Prospective trade partners improve domestic labor standards “on their 
belief that, holding other factors constant, having stronger labor protection than other 
states increases the likelihood of entering into a [FTA] negotiation with a fair trade 
state and the likelihood of having a negotiated [FTA] ratified.”116  For example, 
Morocco enacted comprehensive labor law reform in 2004 before entering into its 
FTA in 2006.
117
  Similarly, in January 2005 the U. S. trade representative indicated 
that the US would not conclude an FTA with Oman until it had addressed worker 
rights issues.
118
  In July 2006 the Omani government “issued a royal decree on 
workers’ rights aimed in part at winning congressional support for” the FTA.119  
Panama is another example of a country which responded to US trade representative 
                                                          
  111  Free Trade Agreement, US-Chile FTA, supra n. 98 at art. 22; Free Trade Agreement, 
US-Australia, supra n. 98 at art. 21; Free Trade Agreement, US-Bahrain, supra n. 98 at art. 
19; Free Trade Agreement, US-Oman, supra n. 98 at art. 20; Free Trade Agreement, US-
Singapore, supra n. 98 at art. 20; Free Trade Agreement, US-Morocco, supra n. 98 at art. 20; 
CAFTA, supra n. 98 at art. 20. 
  112  Trade Promotion Agreement, US-Peru, supra n. 99 at art. 17; Trade Promotion 
Agreement, US-Panama, supra n. 99 at art. 16; Free Trade Agreement, US-Korea, supra n. 99 
at art. 19; Free Trade Agreement, US-Colombia, supra n. 99 at art. 17. 
  113  Trade Promotion Agreement, US-Peru, supra n. 99 at art. 21; Trade Promotion 
Agreement, US-Panama, supra n. 99 at art. 20; Free Trade Agreement, US-Korea, supra n. 99 
at art. 22; Free Trade Agreement, US-Colombia, supra n. 99 at art. 21. 
  114  ILO, supra n. 9 at 32-33 Table 2.1. 
  115  Moonhawk Kim, Ex Ante Due Diligence: Formation of PTAs and Protection of 
Labor Rights, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 704 (2012). 
  116  Id. at 717. 
  117  Id. at 714; see also Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 96 at 17. 
  118  Gary Yerkey, United States to Shelve Trade Accords With Oman, UAE Absent 
Worker Protections, 8 Daily Lab. Rep. (Bloomberg BNA) A-9 (Jan. 12, 2005). 
  119  Gary Yerkey, Oman Issues Decree on Workers' Rights In Bid to Win Congressional 
Support for FTA, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (Bloomberg BNA) A-8 (July 12, 2006); see also 
Rogowsky and Chyn, supra n. 96 at 21-22. 
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concerns over labor rights issues by enacting a series of reforms prior to US 
ratification of their FTA.
120
 
 Colombia presents a case of both pre-ratification and post-ratification 
improvements.  The US and Colombia negotiated a Labor Action Plan (LAP) prior 
to the ratification of the FTA to address deficiencies in Colombian protection for 
worker rights.  The Colombian Government created a new Labor Ministry and 
approved a budget to fund the hiring of the first 100 inspectors.  It also established 
an educational out-reach program to promote awareness of a new system for citizen 
labor complaints.
121
  The government issued a decree to grant collective bargaining 
rights to public sector workers and enacted legislation to prohibit discrimination 
based on race, ethnic origin, religion, nationality, political ideology, gender and 
sexual orientation.
122
  The government also enacted criminal penalties, including 
fines and imprisonment, for employers which interfere with worker freedom to form 
trade unions.
123
 
 After the FTA was ratified in October, 2011, representatives of the US and 
Colombia have held meetings at both the technical and senior levels to monitor 
continued compliance with the LAP and Colombia has been working with the ILO to 
develop its capacity for enforcing labor law.
124
  Colombia continued to hire 
additional labor inspectors, trained police to investigate violence against trade union 
members and leaders and enacted new legislation dealing with unlawful 
subcontracting of work.
125
  Given the long history of internal armed conflict within 
Colombia including violence against trade unionists, challenges remain in addressing 
effective protection for worker rights. The trade union movement in both the US and 
Colombia continue to highlight deficiencies and pressure the governments to take 
appropriate corrective action.
126
 
                                                          
  120  ILO, supra note 94 at 39; WHITE HOUSE, Labor protections and the U.S.-Panama 
Trade Promotion Agreement, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/panama_trade_agreement_labor.pdf. 
  121  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Colombian Action Plan 
Related to Labor Rights (2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2787. 
  122  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Recent Labor Rights 
Advances in Colombia (2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
sheets/2011/october/recent-labor-rights-advances-colombia. 
  123  U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF 
COLOMBIA, LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 16 (2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/colombia_LRR.pdf. 
  124  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Update: The Colombian Labor 
Action Plan: Three Years Later (2014), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Colombia%20Labor%20Action%20Plan%20update%20
fi nal-April2014.pdf. 
  125 
Id.
 
  126  AFL-CIO, THE COLOMBIAN ACTION PLAN RELATED TO LABOR RIGHTS 
(July 2012), 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/38251/594971/report+version+2+no+bug.pdf ; ALF- 
CIO, MAKING THE COLOMBIA LABOR ACTION PLAN WORK FOR WORKERS 
(April 2014), 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/123141/3414471/April2014_ColombiaReport.pdf. 
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 In terms of other post-ratification initiatives, a Peruvian trade union filed a 
submission under the US-Peru FTA with the US national contact point alleging the 
failure by a public sector agency to comply with domestic collective bargaining 
laws. After a review of the situation and discussions between the parties, the 
Peruvian government took steps to clarify the law regarding collective bargaining 
and an arbitration panel issued an award.  The Peruvian trade union credited the 
review by the US as encouraging Peru to take adopt positive steps to address the 
problem.
127
 
 In 2011 the AFL-CIO filed a submission under the US-Bahrain FTA alleging 
violations of freedom of association as well as anti-union, religious and political 
discrimination.
128
  After a review, the US Secretary of Labor issued a report 
concluding that Bahrain did not comply with its commitments under the FTA and 
recommended consultations with the government pursuant to the compliance 
mechanisms in the FTA.  The report did note, however, that the Bahraini 
government had taken steps to insure the rehiring of illegally fired workers.
129
 
 A joint submission filed by the AFL-CIO and several Guatemalan trade unions 
alleged failure by Guatemala to enforce their domestic labor laws, specifically with 
regard to anti-union discrimination and violence as well as violations of the right to 
engage in collective bargaining.
130
  After a review, the U.S. Secretary of Labor 
requested consultations with Guatemala regarding its apparent failure to effectively 
enforce its laws.
131
  Consultations were held with a view to reaching agreement on 
an enforcement plan.  When agreement could not be reached, the U.S. Government 
requested the convening of an arbitral panel pursuant to the dispute mechanisms in 
CAFTA.
132
  The panel was established, but its work suspended as Guatemala and the 
US reopened negotiations for an enforcement plan which was subsequently agreed 
                                                          
  127  OFFICE OF TRADE AND LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, PUBLIC 
REPORT OF REVIEW OF OFFICE OF TRADE AND LABOR AFFAIRS U.S. 
SUBMISSION 2010-13 (Peru) (2012), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/PeruSubmission2012.pdf; ILO, supra note 94 at 51-52. 
  128  AFL-CIO Submission, Concerning the Failure of the Government of Bahrain to 
Comply with its Commitments under Article 15.1 of the US-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 
(2011) available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/BahrainSubmission2011.pdf. 
  129  OFFICE OF TRADE AND LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, PUBLIC 
REPORT OF REVIEW OF U.S. SUBMISSION 2011-01 (Bahrain)(2012), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/20121220Bahrain.pdf. 
  130  AFL-CIO et al. Submission, Concerning the Failure of the Government of Guatemala 
to Effectively Enforce its Labor Laws (2008), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/GuatemalaSub.pdf. 
  131  Letter from Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative and Hilda Solis, U.S. Secretary of 
Labor, to Erick Echeverria, Minister of Economy, Guatemala, and Edgar Rodriguez, Minister 
of Labor and Social Protection, Guatemala (July 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/20100730-Letter.pdf. 
  132  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative 
Ron Kirk Announces Next Step in Labor Rights Enforcement Case Against Guatemala 
(August, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/august/us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-announces-next-ste. 
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to.
133
  While the enforcement plan was being negotiated, Guatemala hired 100 
additional labor inspectors and five additional attorneys in the labor inspection 
office.
134
  The enforcement plan was to be implemented over a period of six months, 
with the possibility for an additional six month extension.
135
  Upon expiration of that 
extension period, the AFL-CIO sent a letter to the U.S. Trade Representative 
requesting that arbitration be reinstituted, asserting that Guatemala was still failing to 
effectively enforce its laws.
136
  While noting that Guatemala had made some 
improvements, the Trade Representative indicated that it has not fully implemented 
the terms of the enforcement plan, but gave Guatemala an additional four months 
extension while visiting the country for talks regarding implementation.
137
 
 Even in the case of the Jordan-US FTA where the governments had pledged not 
to use the enforcement mechanisms available under the agreement to settle disputes, 
improvements were made regarding worker rights protections in response to a 
complaint filed by the AFL-CIO and the National Textile Association.
138
  Jordan 
increased inspections in the garment sector, closed a factory where labor violations 
were occurring, increased its minimum wage and drafted a new labor law.   
Additionally, USAID funded an effort to reform and improve the operations of the 
Jordanian Ministry of Labor.
139
 
 As mentioned earlier, the EU approach to labor standards in FTAs is mainly 
promotional.  Their agreements emphasize technical assistance and consultation.
140
  
A recent study of the effectiveness of EU promotional compliance efforts found that, 
                                                          
  133  News Release, U.S. Dept. Of Labor, Acting US Trade Representative Marantis and 
Acting Labor Secretary Harris Announce Groundbreaking Labor Rights Enforcement 
Agreement with Guatemala (April 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20130691.htm. 
  134  Mutually Agreed Enforcement Action Plan between the Government of the United 
States and the Government of Guatemala ¶ 3, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/0413GuatEnforcementPlan.pdf. 
  135  Id. at 13 ¶18. 
  136  Brian Flood, Labor Groups Say Guatemala Labor Practices Violate Trade 
Agreement, Call for Arbitration, 78 Daily Lab. Rep. (Bloomberg-BNA) A-4 (April 23, 2014). 
  137  Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Trade Representative Pushes Guatemala to Abide by 
International Labor Commitments, 28 Lab. Rel. Wkly (Bloomberg BNA) 1694 (Aug. 6, 
2014). 
  138  Request by the AFL-CIO and the National Textile Association to the United States to 
Invoke Consultations under the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement to Address 
Jordan’s Violations of the Agreement’s Labor Rights Provisions (Sept. 21, 2006)(on file with 
the author, available through 184 Daily Lab. Rep. A-112, Sept. 22, 2006). 
  139  INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL LABOUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS, USAID To 
Oversee Jordan Labor Reforms, Talks Under FTA Unlikely (Apr. 20, 2007)(reprinted from 
Inside U.S. Trade), http://www.globallabourrights.org/press/usaid-to-oversee-jordan-labor-
reforms-talks-under-fta-unlikely; See David A. Gantz, Labor Rights and Environmental 
Protections Under NAFTA and Other U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 297, 326-7 (2011). 
  140  See generally, ILO supra note 95 at 69-71 and Table 3.2. 
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while there is initial improvement during the negotiation stage of FTAs, the “greatest 
advancement in labor rights is exhibited ex post, after the [FTA] is in force.”141 
 Similar to the GSP mechanism, FTAs have the advantage over CoCs in terms of 
country coverage, enforcement and labor standards coverage.  When labor standards 
are improved and enforced pursuant to FTAs, the benefits are realized throughout the 
labor market.  As with GSP, almost all US FTAs have a mechanism to allow third 
parties to initiate a review process for compliance.  Thus, those parties with an 
interest in ensuring the effectiveness of labor rights (i.e. trade unions and human 
rights NGOs) have a role in implementation.  The submission mechanism has also 
created opportunities for cross-border trade union cooperation as evidenced by joint 
submissions under the NAALC and CAFTA.
142
  Both pre- and post-negotiation 
improvements to labor conditions indicate the relative effectiveness of FTAs as 
instruments for ensuring compliance with labor standards, although there is clearly 
still room for more robust compliance mechanisms.  Finally, most of the FTAs use 
the ILO core labor standards as the metric for guaranteeing labor rights. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 On both a practical and philosophical level, the GSP/FTA mechanisms are 
superior to CoCs for ensuring protection of worker rights. While political 
considerations often influence the ultimate imposition of penalties under GSP/FTAs, 
the evidence indicates that the review process itself influences governments to 
positively improve labor standards.  Trade sanctions have been imposed under the 
GSP system; thus the threat of the review system (with the implied possibility of 
sanctions) is itself relatively credible.  There is little evidence, however, to support 
the proposition that CoC monitoring systems have appreciably improved working 
standards or that the enforcement mechanisms have been invoked often enough to 
constitute a credible deterrent to suppliers.   There is also greater transparency and 
accountability to governmental monitoring systems which is missing from most 
corporate CoC monitoring.  Moreover the GSP/FTA enforcement process 
strengthens trade unions allowing them to play a role in initiating the process, as 
compared to the top down approach of CoCs which envisions no role for third party 
enforcement measures.  The content of the labor conditionality provisions in 
governmental programs almost always include the ILO core labour standards 
(including FOA and CB) while CoCs are much less likely to focus on FOA and CB.  
Lastly, the effect of any improvements in labor standards is widely distributed 
throughout the economy under the GSP/FTA whereas any improvements under 
CoCs proceed company by company. 
                                                          
  141  Postnikov & Bastiaens, supra note 102 at 935. 
  142  Joint Submission under NAALC Filed by U.S. Communications Workers Union and 
the Union of Telephone Workers of Mexico in U.S. NAO Submission 9602 (1996), available 
at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/US_9602_Maxi-Switch_submission.pdf; Joint 
Submission Filed under NAALC by, inter alia, the Canadian Auto Workers and the 
International Brotherhood of Teamster (U.S.) in U.S. NAO Submission 9703 (1997), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/US_97-03_ITAPSA_submission.pdf; 
Joint Submission Filed under NAALC by, inter alia, the Mexican Union of Electric Workers, 
the AFL-CIO and the Canadian Autoworkers in U.S. NAO Submission 2011-02 (2011), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/MexicoSubmission2011.pdf; Joint 
Submission of the AFL-CIO and Six Guatemalan Unions under CAFTA (2008), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/GuatemalaSub.pdf. 
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 IFAs, like CoCs, are also limited to a company-by-company impact; and indeed 
that impact may be even more limited given that the number of MNCs with IFAs is 
fewer than MNCs with CoCs.  However, IFAs are the product of joint decision-
making and agreement between management and representatives of the workers, 
unlike CoCs which are unilaterally imposed by management.  Like the GSP/FTA 
systems, IFAs encourage cross-border trade union cooperation which helps to 
empower the workers and their representatives.  Enforcement does not rely solely on 
corporate willingness, but involves direct action by trade unions.  Similar to the 
GSP/FTA, all IFAs reference the obligation by the corporation to respect FOA and 
CB. 
 This is not to say that CoCs should be abolished.  The public advocacy which led 
to their creation has succeeded in raising awareness of labor conditions in the MNC 
supply chain as well as labor conditions throughout the world generally.  While 
certainly not the best method for ensuring protection for worker rights, their 
continued existence does not necessarily impede the ability to pursue more powerful 
and effective strategies, unless, of course, corporations and recalcitrant governments 
use CoCs as a shield to prevent the use of better mechanisms by arguing that CoCs 
are sufficient to the task. 
 The bottom line for ensuring protection for worker rights is the empowerment of 
workers to voice their concerns and to act to safeguard those concerns on a daily 
basis without fear of reprisal.  This requires protection for workers to act together 
(whether through a trade union or other associational body) to determine their 
interests, voice those interests to the employer and participate in concerted action to 
make their voices heard.  Which of these mechanisms is most likely to achieve that 
aim?  CoCs are top-down, paternalistic systems responding to public outcry. IFAs 
strengthen and support worker voice but are limited by their coverage – both in 
terms of numbers of MNCs which are signatories and the limited breadth of their 
impact.  GSPs and FTAs, while political tools aimed at improving trade relations, 
have as a major corollary benefit the enhancement of worker rights, including FOA 
and CB, along with an ability for trade unions and worker rights groups to actively 
monitor their implementation whether through initiation of complaints (in the U.S. 
system) or through social dialogue and technical assistance (in the EU system). 
 None of the discussed mechanisms are perfect, but one should not let the perfect 
be the enemy of the good.  All can be useful – some more than others – in educating 
the public to the importance of worker rights, holding MNCs’ feet to the fire in 
ensuring worker rights, and creating incentives for national governments to enact 
legislation for protecting worker rights and ensuring effective enforcement. 
 
 
 
 
  
